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Letter to the Editor
A reply – acknowledged reasonable limitations in a
secondary analysis but key conclusions remain in
‘The neural basis of ﬂashback formation: the impact
of viewing trauma’
The current letter by Mole (2016) highlights three re-
cent papers from our laboratory that have attempted
to investigate how the initial processing of intrusively
remembered episodes leads to their formation
(Bourne et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2014, 2016). These intru-
sively remembered episodes are from ﬁlms with trau-
matic content. Intrusive memories (referred to as
ﬂashbacks in Bourne et al. 2013) are ones which come
to mind unbidden, and have particular relevance to
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Mole (2016)
suggests that one of the subanalyses performed in
Bourne et al. (2013) is methodologically ﬂawed and
questions some of our subsequent interpretations.
While there are elements of the critique we accept,
we would like to refute some of the inferences drawn
by Mole (2016). In particular, we argue that the main
conclusions of our papers are not affected by the
‘methodological ﬂaw’ raised.
The main aim of Bourne et al. (2013) and the subse-
quent paperswas to investigate the neural basis of intru-
sive memory encoding of experimental trauma,
hypothesizing that the later occurrence of an intrusive
memory would be determined by the neural activity
during the original encoding. Results from our three
papers support this notion: ﬁrst, by identifying and sub-
sequently replicating a widespread ‘neural signature’ at
the time of viewing (encoding) scenes that later became
intrusive (Bourne et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2016); and
second, by using machine learning to predict the occur-
rence of later intrusive memories solely from the brain
imaging data at encoding (Clark et al. 2014).
The ‘methodological ﬂaw’ eloquently raised by Mole
(2016) relates to a secondary analysis that was per-
formed to investigate potential alternative explana-
tions for our ﬁndings; namely, that emotional
processing or physiological arousal could completely
explain the pattern of brain activation observed
(Bourne et al. 2013, online Supplementary materials).
Mole (2016) speciﬁcally critiques our attempt to control
for the subjective emotional experience of different
scene types. Participants provided retrospective
(1-week post-ﬁlm) ratings of the emotionality of each
scene on a 10-point scale. These ratings were then
used as covariates in a secondary analysis of the func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. The
limitation that Mole (2016) raises concerns the mixture
of coarse-grained (subjective emotional rating) and
ﬁne-grained [fMRI blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) signal] measurements. We accept this poten-
tial limitation, but note that the BOLD response itself
is a relatively course measure of relative changes in
brain activity (e.g. Raichle, 1998). Further, we support
Mole’s (2016) point that a persistence of activations
associated with intrusive memories even following co-
variation of the coarse-grained emotional response
does not mean that these activations could not be
mediated by ﬁner-grained measurements of emotion
(or emotion in general). Indeed, Bourne et al. (2013)
state that ‘intense emotional reaction may be a neces-
sary condition for ﬂashback formation’ (p. 1529).
However, we question the extent to which this could
be described as a ‘ﬂaw’ in our data, interpretations
and conclusions. This limitation has no bearing on
our main analyses nor the interpretations and conclu-
sions that are drawn – namely that there is a speciﬁc
peri-traumatic pattern of brain activation that predicts
intrusive memory formation.
Thus, while Mole (2016) raises interesting potential
methodological limitations of our secondary analysis,
we disagree with the interpretations and conclusions
that Mole draws. Bourne et al. (2013) did not claim
that the secondary analysis was a mathematical
proof, nor that it meant that emotion played no role
in intrusive memory encoding. Rather, Bourne et al.
(2013) used the secondary analysis (heavily caveated
by several methodological limitations) together with
the region of interest (ROI) analysis to suggest that
emotional response did not seem to fully explain the
differential processing detected in intrusive-memory
encoding. Speciﬁcally, the ROI analysis (Bourne et al.
2013, p. 1527) provides two key pieces of information:
ﬁrst, many brain regions not associated with emotional
processing are implicated (with the acknowledged cav-
eat of the limitations of reverse inference); and second,
although the pattern of BOLD response for many brain
regions could be compatible with an emotion-mediated
process [i.e. Actual (Intrusive) > Potential > Control],
crucially the left inferior frontal gyrus and middle tem-
poral gyrus show activation that is not compatible
with simple increasing levels of emotionality – activity
in these areas is lower during Potential scenes
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than during both Control and Actual (Intrusive)
scenes.
Mole (2016) argues that there are distinct emotion-
based and cognitive-based hypotheses for the forma-
tion of intrusive memories. He states: ‘Bourne et al.
suggest that the evidence given in their 2013 study
favours hypotheses of this second type’ – referring to
a favouring of cognitive processing over emotional
processing for the formation of intrusive memories.
We strongly disagree. We wrote that ‘although intense
emotional reaction may be a necessary condition for
ﬂashback formation it appears not to be sufﬁcient’ in
Bourne et al. (2013; p 1529), by which we intended to
suggest that intrusive memoires are not formed solely
due to extreme emotion, but also due to a number of
other factors. In other words, heighted emotion is ne-
cessary, but alone it is not sufﬁcient, requiring the in-
volvement of other cognitive processes for intrusive
memory formation.
We continue to argue that both cognitive processing
and emotional processing are important for intrusive
memory formation – that these are not alternative hy-
potheses. Peri-traumatic emotional processing has
long been highlighted as important for the development
of PTSD (e.g. American Psychiatric Association, 2000;
Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Brewin, 2014) and for experi-
mentally induced intrusive memories (e.g. Clark &
Mackay, 2015; Clark et al. 2015). For intrusive/involun-
tary memories, emotional processing includes negative
and positive emotions (Berntsen & Rubin, 2008; Clark
et al. 2013). Other cognitive process, e.g. pre-trauma
scores of depression, anxiety, schizopty and attention,
have also been highlighted as important for intrusive
memory formation (Steel et al. 2008; Verwoerd et al.
2008; Clark et al. 2015). Unlike Mole (2016), we do not
argue that these are distinct hypotheses and explana-
tions. Instead, we suggest the evidence taken together
strongly implies that emotional processing is important
for intrusive memory formation but that other factors in
addition to emotion are also important (as we have
argued elsewhere, e.g. Holmes & Bourne, 2008).
While we emphasize the importance of understand-
ing how intrusive memories are ﬁrst encoded, we also
acknowledge the signiﬁcance of processing at later
time points. Understanding processing at the time of
experimental trauma is essential for understanding
the formation of intrusive memories; for example, per-
forming visuospatial tasks while viewing traumatic
footage reduces the frequency of later intrusive mem-
ories (Bourne et al. 2010); the neural underpinnings
during encoding are different for later intrusively
remembered footage than material that does not in-
trude (Bourne et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2014, 2016).
However, we welcome investigations of other aspects
of intrusive memory recollection and interpretation
post-trauma. Indeed, work from our group highlights
the importance of the memory (re)consolidation phases
after viewing experimental trauma – manipulations
post-event using visuospatial tasks can reduce intru-
sive memory formation (Holmes et al. 2010; James
et al. 2015). Our neuroimaging papers (Bourne et al.
2013; Clark et al. 2014, 2016) attempt to highlight the
importance of the relatively under researched area of
peri-traumatic factors in addition to the post-traumatic
factors which are more commonly studied.
Mole (2016) ﬁnishes his critique highlighting the ‘in-
herent limitations of affective introspection (Haybron,
2007)’ in relation to the limitations of our coarse-
grained analysis. Reliance on self-report measures
and introspection without objective measures has
long been an issue in understanding human cognition.
Physiological measures (e.g. fMRI and heart rate) at-
tempt to overcome some of the limitations of self-
report. Interestingly, heart rate was also used as a cov-
ariate in Bourne et al. (2013) in a separate secondary
analysis, with convergent results to both that of the
main and emotion covariate analyses. Self-report mea-
sures remain a mainstay of psychiatry and psychology,
and are predictive of later symptoms of PTSD (e.g. self-
report peri-traumatic emotional response and peri-
traumatic dissociation; Ozer et al. 2003). Until such
day a magic device is developed that can provide an
objective and ﬁne-grained measure of subjective emo-
tions (and other cognitions), they remain, despite in-
herent limitations, a valuable part of experimental
medicine, experimental psychopathology and clinical
studies.
We thank Mole (2016) for raising an interesting dis-
cussion in regards to methodological limitations within
one of the secondary analyses presented in Bourne
et al. (2013). In sum, the main aim of the original
paper (and our subsequent replication) was to investi-
gate whether the occurrence of an intrusive memory is
determined by the neural activity during the original
encoding of experimental trauma. While we acknow-
ledge some limitations of our subanalyses testing alter-
native explanations for our ﬁndings, these limitations
do not detract from the main ﬁndings and conclusions
of our papers. Understanding the contributions of
heightened memory and emotional processing at the
time of traumatic stimuli is critical (but not exclusively
so!) for the development, and possible treatment, of in-
trusive memories in PTSD and elsewhere.
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